Digital sovereignty: how much control do you have over your digital operations?

Today, companies entrust more and more of their data, applications, and business processes to cloud services, digital platforms, and external providers. This brings numerous advantages: faster solution deployment, greater flexibility, and access to technologies that would be difficult to develop or maintain independently. 

At the same time, dependence on providers, their technologies, commercial terms, and infrastructure is also increasing. This makes it ever more important to ask how much control the company actually retains. 

Digital sovereignty does not mean the company has to develop and host all systems itself. Nor does it mean complete independence from external providers. Above all, it means the company understands its digital dependencies, maintains control over critical data and systems, and can act when technology, providers, or business conditions change. 

It is about the ability to choose, adapt, and keep operating. That is why digital sovereignty matters not only for public institutions and large corporations, but for any organization whose business depends on digital solutions. 

Who controls our data? 

When we talk about digital sovereignty, we often first ask where the data is stored. That matters, but location alone does not tell us who actually controls it. 

Even if data is physically stored in the European Union, that does not mean the organization has full control over it. In certain circumstances, cloud, hosting, business software, or other managed IT service providers—as well as their subcontractors and other authorized parties—may access it. 

Beyond location, it is therefore important to verify who has access to the data, on what legal and contractual basis, and under which conditions. The organization must also appropriately restrict, log, and regularly review access. 

Another important question is who manages the encryption keys. If data is encrypted but the keys are managed solely by the provider, the customer has less direct control over its protection than it might appear at first glance. For more sensitive data, it is therefore advisable to check whether the organization can manage the keys itself, or at least control their use, rotation, and revocation. 

Control over data also requires clear answers to practical questions: 

• who has administrative access, 

• whether access rights are reviewed regularly, 

• how accounts of former employees and external contractors are deprovisioned, 

• whether it is possible to determine who accessed the data and when, and 

• who is responsible for taking action in the event of potential misuse. 

Digital sovereignty therefore does not start with the server, but with transparency. The organization must know which data is critical, where it resides, who processes it, and who can access or alter it. 

The question “Where is our data?” is a good start. For real control, we must add another: “Who else has the keys to it?” 

How dependent are we on a given provider? 

Using external providers is now a standard part of digital business. Cloud services, business software, and managed IT solutions enable companies to develop faster, be more flexible, and access expertise they may not have in-house. The problem is therefore not dependence per se, but dependence we do not understand well enough or do not have under control. 

An organization may be tightly bound to a particular provider because of the technology, contractual terms, ways of working, or unique functionalities that cannot easily be replicated elsewhere. Such lock-in often only becomes apparent when the company wants to switch the service, reduce its scope, or adapt its processes to another environment. 

It is therefore important to know: 

• how tightly our processes, knowledge, and day-to-day operations are tied to a specific provider, 

• whether the solution enables well-documented and as standardized as possible integration with other systems, 

• whether another supplier can take over the solution, 

• whether the organization has access to documentation, configurations, and administrative accounts, 

• how much time and budget a provider switch would require, and 

• what contractual and technical constraints apply upon termination of the engagement. 

Complete independence from providers is rarely practical. Using specialized solutions often brings significant benefits, but the decision to use them should be deliberate. The company should understand the benefits of the chosen solution, as well as the costs and implications of a potential exit. 

Digital sovereignty therefore does not mean avoiding vendor lock-in at all costs. It means understanding where we are dependent, why we chose to be, and how we would act if the terms of engagement changed. 

A good question is not only: “Are we satisfied with our provider?” Equally important is: “What would happen if we had to replace it?” 

Can we continue operations during a disruption? 

Digital sovereignty is not only about control over data and providers; it is also about business resilience. The key question is whether the organization can continue working if an important digital service temporarily fails or becomes unavailable. 

Disruptions can have various causes: a cloud service outage, loss of internet connectivity, a cyber incident, an error at the provider, loss of access to user accounts, or an issue with system integrations. In such cases, it is not only about whether a backup exists, but also how quickly operations can be restored and which business processes can be executed differently in the meantime. 

The organization should therefore know the answers to a few basic questions: 

• which systems are truly critical to the business, 

• how long a given system can be down, 

• whether usable and tested backups exist, 

• who is responsible for restoration, 

• whether incident procedures are documented, and 

• which alternative communication channels are available to employees and customers during a disruption. 

The difference between a backup and a business continuity plan also matters. A backup enables data recovery, but does not necessarily ensure the organization can quickly resume work. If responsibility for initiating recovery, the prioritization of services, and the expected time to restore are not defined in advance, a backup alone does not ensure continuity of operations. 

An organization that wants to strengthen its digital sovereignty does not assume disruptions will not occur. It must know its critical dependencies, define response and recovery procedures, and regularly verify that they work in practice. 

The question, then, is not only: “Do we have backups?” More important is: “Can we continue to operate during a disruption?” 

Can we move our systems and data elsewhere? 

The ability to migrate data and systems is one of the most concrete tests of digital sovereignty. An organization may have good control over its current environment, but its actual freedom is limited if it cannot change the provider, platform, or infrastructure without disproportionate costs, lengthy interruptions, or data loss. 

It is therefore not enough for the provider to allow data export. What also matters is the format we can export it in, whether the data is complete, understandable, and usable, and whether it can be transferred to another environment without major effort. An export in a vendor-specific or poorly documented format does not equate to true portability. 

When assessing this, it makes sense to check: 

• whether all key data can be exported together with metadata and history, 

• whether the formats are documented and supported in other systems as well, 

• whether integrations and connections to other solutions are properly documented, 

• whether the organization has access to configurations, documentation, and source code where relevant, 

• how much time, cost, and technical effort a migration would require, and 

• whether the contract clearly defines the process upon termination of the relationship. 

It is also important to ask whether the system can continue to operate in a comparable way after migration. Data can often be moved, but it is much harder to replace the business rules, automations, integrations, and specific functionalities that have evolved around a platform over the years. 

Portability is therefore not just a technical attribute. It is a combination of data formats, documentation, contractual provisions, system architecture, and the organization’s readiness for change. 

Digital sovereignty does not require the company to actually switch providers. What matters is that it has a realistic ability to do so when there are business, technology, or security reasons. 

A good question, therefore, is not only: “Can we export the data?” More important is: “Can we also use it effectively elsewhere?” 

Digital sovereignty starts with understanding dependencies 

Digital sovereignty does not mean an organization must store all data on its own servers, develop its own software, or avoid external providers. Such an approach would be expensive, demanding, and often less secure for most companies. 

It does mean the organization understands which technologies, providers, and processes it depends on. It must know who controls its data, how it would operate during a disruption, and whether it could move critical systems to another environment if needed. 

Complete independence in the digital world is almost impossible and often not sensible. What matters is that the organization knows its dependencies, understands their implications, and manages the risks appropriately. 

A quick test of digital sovereignty: which questions should an organization ask itself? 

For an initial assessment of digital sovereignty, an organization can ask itself a few key questions:  

• Do we know where our key data is and who can access it?

• Do we have control over administrative accounts and access rights? 

• Do we know which systems are critical to our business? 

• Do we have tested procedures for response and recovery? 

• Can we export our data in a usable and documented format? 

• Could we change providers without disproportionate cost or prolonged downtime? 

• Do we have sufficient documentation and knowledge for another team to take over the system? 

If the answers to these questions are clear, the organization has already taken an important step toward greater digital sovereignty. If not, that is no cause for alarm. It is, however, a good reason to start reviewing its digital dependencies more systematically. 

Ultimately, digital sovereignty is not a question of whether we depend on others. It is a question of whether we know our dependencies and can manage them.